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WHERE ARE YOUR PAPERS?
PHOTO IDENTIFICATION AS A
PREREQUISITE TO VOTING*
Michael J. Kasper**
ABSTRACT
Remember the old war movies? Richard Attenborough or Wil-
liam Holden is slowly walking down misty Parisian streets, the collar
of his trench turned up, the brim of the fedora pulled low. A black
sedan screeches around the corner and screams to a stop in front of
him before he has time to react. Soldiers bound from the car, pistols
drawn, and bark "Vhere are your papers?"
When did America become this movie? The U.S. Supreme
Court will take up this question this term. This article explores five
recent state laws, from Indiana, Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, and Mis-
souri requiring citizens to present proof of identity, in the form of a
government issued photo identification card, as a prerequisite to voting
in a polling place on Election Day. In Crawford v. Marion County Elec.
Bd., the Seventh Circuit upheld an Indiana election law that required
virtually all voters to show a government-issued photo identification in
order to vote on Election Day. On September 25, 2007, the United
States Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of certiorari in
Crawford and will decide the constitutionality of these so-called "voter
identification" laws. This article examines these laws under the First
and Fourteenth Amendment and concludes that these statutes, al-
though they do not impose a severe burden on the right to vote, should
nonetheless be invalidated.
I. INTRODUCTION
We have all seen the movies: Richard Attenborough or William
Holden slowly walking down a misty, Parisian street, wearing a trench
coat with the collar turned up, and the brim of the fedora pulled low. A
* The Supreme Court has taken a position on this subject. See Crawford v. Marion
County Elec. Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610.
** Michael Kasper is an Adjunct Professor of voting rights and election law at Loyola
University of Chicago Law School, and a partner at Fletcher, Topol, O'Brien & Kasper, P.C.
He represents the Democratic Party of Illinois.
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black sedan screeches around the corner and screams to a stop in front
of him before he has time to react. Soldiers bound from the car, pistols
drawn. In the next scene, he sits in a dark, windowless room lit only by
a single desk-top banker's lamp. Behind the tidy desk, a thin, menac-
ing looking officer with a stiff collar buttoned tight, pulls on a cigarette,
opens the file, looks up, and says to the prisoner, "Vhere are your
papers?"
When did America become this movie? The U.S. Supreme
Court will decide that very question this term.1 The easy answer is, of
course, that America became this movie in the aftermath of September
11, 2001,2 when Americans became accustomed to showing identifica-
tion for the purpose of maintaining safety and security at airports and
other public places. These inconveniences have been accepted as the
price to pay to maintain that safety. Several years later, have these
habits dulled our sensitivity to unnecessary or even ill-intended de-
mands that we identify ourselves to government officials?
Certainly it is a long way from the jack-booted soldiers from the
old war movies, Americans must now identify themselves more often
than ever before. This article explores five recent state laws from Indi-
ana, Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, and Missouri requiring citizens to
present proof of identity, in the form of a government issued photo
identification card, as a prerequisite to voting in a polling place on
Election Day.3 None of these laws were enacted for the purpose of
safety or security, but instead were passed purportedly to combat in-
person voter fraud by making it more difficult to impersonate another
person and illegally vote on another's behalf.
Each of these laws faced a constitutional challenge on the basis
they disproportionately impacted minorities, the poor, and elderly who
are less likely to have a photo identification card than those more afflu-
ent. In Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., the Seventh Circuit
upheld an Indiana election law that required virtually all voters to
show a government-issued photo identification card in order to vote on
Election Day. 4 Similarly, in Gonzalez v. Arizona, the Ninth Circuit up-
1. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 33 (2007) (No. 07-21); Ind.
Democratic Party v. Rokita, 128 S. Ct. 34 (2007) (No. 07-25).
2. See United States v. Smith, 426 F.3d 567, 570 (2d Cir. 2005) ("the requirement of
showing a photo identification was part of a new policy implemented after the events of
September 11, 2001, to protect federal buildings and courthouses").
3. IND. CODE §§ 3-5-2-40.5, 3-10-1-7.2, 3-11-8-25.1 (2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-
417 (2007). ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-579 (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. §168-523
(2005); MO. ANN. STAT. § 115.427 (2006).
4. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007), rehearing
denied, 484 F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 2007), aff.g, 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008)
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held an Arizona statute requiring photo identification as a condition of
voter registration. 5 On the other hand, in Common Cause / Georgia v.
Billups, 6 the District Court in the Northern District of Georgia initially
enjoined enforcement of the Georgia voter identification requirement
for the 2006 election, but recently dismissed the challenge and upheld
the law.7
At the state level, the Michigan Supreme Court recently issued
an advisory opinion at the request of the House of Representatives val-
idating the Michigan photo identification law.8 On the other hand, the
Supreme Court of Missouri invalidated that State's voter identification
statute in Weinshenk v. Missouri.9
To straighten out this conflict between State laws, on Septem-
ber 25, 2007, the Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of
certiorari in Crawford and will tackle the issue this term. 10 This article
will examine whether these laws are permissible under the First and
Fourteenth Amendment and demonstrate why these statutes, al-
though they do not impose a severe burden on the right to vote, should
nonetheless be invalidated."
II. THE VOTER IDENTIFICATION LAWS AND THEIR CHALLENGES
A. The Indiana Voter Identification Statute
In upholding the Indiana law in Crawford, the Seventh Circuit
ruled that the identification law imposed only a slight burden on a
5. Gonzalez v. Arizona, 485 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2007).
6. Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
7. Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (N.D. Ga. 2007).
8. In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 2005, 740
N.W.2d 444 (Mich. 2007).
9. Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201 (Mo. 2006).
10. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 33, 33 (2007), affd, 128 S.
Ct. 1610 (2008).
11. Each of these cases also addressed, at one stage of the litigation, the issue of
whether or not the voter ID statute constituted an unconstitutional poll tax in violation of
the 24th Amendment to the United States Constitution. Each of the federal courts rejected
this argument (See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007);
Gonzalez, 485 F.3d at 1049; Billups, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1354). The Michigan Supreme Court
likewise rejected the notion that its voter ID was a poll tax. In re Request for Advisory
Opinion, 740 N.W.2d at 464-65. The Supreme Court of Missouri did not specifically call the
voter ID law a poll tax, but did rule that because the exercise of the right to vote was
predicated upon the expenditure of money it was unconstitutional. Weinschenk, 203 S.W.3d
at 213. This article, due to the unanimity of the federal courts on this issue, will address
only the First and Fourteenth amendment issues.
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minimal number of potential voters. 12 Indeed, Judge Posner's opinion
begins with the proposition that "the benefits of voting to the individ-
ual are elusive" because elections "are never decided by just one
vote."'13 This observation, while certainly correct regarding outcomes,
nonetheless seems a striking dismissal of the very foundation of our
nation. As the Supreme Court has recognized, "the right to exercise
the [voting] franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative
of other basic civil and political rights . . . "14 The benefits of voting
arise not from deciding the outcome, but from participating in the pro-
cess unfettered by the barriers, both real and imagined, that plague
elections throughout much of the world.
Judge Posner also seemed impressed that "there is not a single
plaintiff who intends not to vote because of the new law - that is, who
would vote were it not for the new law." 15 While lack of a victim to step
forward is certainly relevant, it is also understandable. If a person is
too intimidated by the photo identification requirement to expend
thirty minutes to go from home only a few minutes to the local polling
place, it should hardly be surprising that that same person would be
reluctant to lend his or her name to litigation which would result in
having their name plastered all over every newspaper in the country.
For Judge Posner, the case can be summed up quite simply.
First, the vast majority of adults has the identification necessary to
satisfy the law and is accustomed to using it in their daily lives: "try
flying, or even entering a tall building such as the courthouse in which
we sit, without one."1 6 Second, no one complains, other than political
groups, that the law has actually discouraged them from voting. On
the other hand, the purpose of the law is to reduce voter fraud by de-
tecting a person impersonating another in order to illegally cast his or
her ballot. 17
In his dissent, Judge Evans points out that Indiana already had
a criminal law punishing voter fraud with up to three years in prison
and a $10,000 fine, and "no one - in the history of Indiana - had ever
been charged with violating that law."' 8 Judge Posner brushes this
aside, attributing the absence of prosecutions not to the lack of com-
mission of the crime, but instead to the "endemic under[-]enforcement
12. Crawford, 472 F.3d at 951.
13. Id. (emphasis added).
14. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
15. Crawford, 472 F.3d at 952.
16. Id. at 951.
17. Id. at 952.
18. Id. at 955 (Evans, J., dissenting).
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of minor criminal laws", and the "extreme difficulty in apprehending a
vote impersonator." 19
B. The Arizona Voter Identification Proposition
In the November 2004 General Election, Arizona voters ap-
proved Proposition 200 which required proof of citizenship as a
prerequisite to registration and identification for in-person voting.20
The proof of citizenship permitted included: a driver's license, state is-
sued non-driving identification, birth certificate, passport, or other
documents deemed acceptable under federal immigration laws. 21 In
May 2006 a group of voters, civic organizations and Native American
groups filed suit seeking an injunction against both the registration
and voting elements of the identification law. 22
The plaintiffs appealed the District Court's denial of a prelimi-
nary injunction, and shortly before the November 2006 General
Election, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals enjoined enforcement of
the proposition. 23 The State sought relief from the Supreme Court,
which approximately two weeks before the election vacated the Ninth
Circuit order and remanded the case for further proceedings. In reach-
ing its conclusion, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of the
voter identification requirements but instead relied upon the procedu-
ral posture of the case.24
When the District Court denied the preliminary injunction it
did not issue any findings of fact or conclusions of law.25 When the
Ninth Circuit effectively reversed the District Court by issuing the in-
junction, it likewise did not issue a written explanation but instead
issued a "bare order" without explanation or justification. 26 The Su-
preme Court, in vacating the injunction, ruled "[i]t was still necessary,
as a procedural matter, for the Court of Appeals to give deference to
the discretion of the District Court."27 Because there was no evidence
that the Court of Appeals had done so, the Supreme Court vacated the
order.28
19. Id. at 953.
20. Gonzalez v. Arizona, 485 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2007).
21. Id. at 1047.
22. Id. at 1046.
23. Id.
24. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 127 S. Ct. 5, 8 (2006) (No. 06-532).
25. Id. at 7.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id at 6.
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Upon remand, the Ninth Circuit noted that the plaintiffs "chose
not to continue to seek injunctive relief with respect to the in-person
voting identification requirement."29 In dealing with the identification
requirement for voter registration however, the Ninth Circuit effec-
tively upheld the same requirement for in-person voting.30 Like Judge
Posner's decision in Crawford, the Ninth Circuit decision began with
the presumption that "the vast majority of Arizona citizens in all likeli-
hood already possess at least one of the documents sufficient for
registration... "31 The Court then refused to find that the identifica-
tion requirement was "at this stage in the proceedings" a severe
burden on the right to vote, because the plaintiffs' evidence consisted of
only "four declarations from individuals who are not parties to the
litigation."32
C. Georgia's Voter Identification History
The Georgia legislature first passed a voter identification stat-
ute in 1997, 33 which allowed Georgia voters to use one of seventeen
different forms of identification as a pre-condition to entering a pblling
place and voting.34 Voters were not required to show photo identifica-
tion and were permitted to use things such as utility bills, bank
statements or payroll checks. 35 Moreover, voters completely lacking
identification were also permitted to vote by executing an affidavit of
eligibility in the polling place. 36
Since Georgia is a covered jurisdiction under Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act3 7, the 1997 statute required pre-clearance by the De-
partment of Justice. 38 The Department granted pre-clearance because
29. Gonzalez v. Arizona, 485 F.3d 1041, 1046-47 (9th Cir. 2007).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1050.
32. Id.
33. Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1303 (N.D. Ga. 2006); GA.
CODE ANN. § 21-2-417 (2007).
34. GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-417 (2007).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000). Under Section 4 of the Voting Rights
Act, any state that maintained a test or device that denied or abridged the right to vote on
the basis of color and which and had less than a 50% voter registration rate on November 1,
1964 or had less than 50% turnout in the November, 1964 election became a "covered
jurisdiction" subject to the preclearance requirements of Section 5.
38. Billups, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1303.
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the statute contained sufficient safeguards to ensure that "no voters
would be turned away if they did not have proper identification."
39
In 2005, the Georgia legislature enacted a new law requiring all
voters to present a government issued photo identification card in or-
der to vote in a polling place on Election Day.40 Although the "career
staff in the Voting Section of the [Department of Justice]" recom-
mended denial on August 25, 2005, the Department granted pre-
clearance the very next day.41 After that law was enjoined by the Dis-
trict Court, the Georgia General Assembly re-enacted another voter
identification law in 200642 which replaced the 2005 "affidavit of pov-
erty" to obtain state voter identification with a specific "Georgia voter
identification card" for those lacking any other acceptable forms of
identification. 43 The District Court then took up the question of the
constitutionality of the 2006 Act. 44
As with the Indiana statute in Crawford, Georgia officials had
not received any complaints of in-person voter fraud since the statute
was first enacted in 1997. 45 Additionally, the District Court of the
Northern District of Georgia found that "the possibility of someone vot-
ing under the name of a deceased person has been addressed by [the
Secretary of State's] monthly removal of recently deceased persons
from the voter roles."46 Unlike the Indiana litigation, in Billups a
number of "would-be Georgia voters" presented evidence that they did
not have the requisite identification and "have no need for them in
their day-to-day lives" and would be affected by the voter identification
statute. 47 As a result, the District Court concluded that the 2006 stat-
ute was "not narrowly tailored to the State's proffered interest of
preventing voter fraud."48
The Georgia statute applied only to in-person voting, but the
District Court found that the "evidence addressed fraud in the area of
voter registration and absentee voting, rather than in-person voting."
49
The District Court further recognized that the State had less restric-
39. Id. at 1304.
40. Id. at 1304.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1298.
43. Id. at 1305.
44. Id. at 1300.
45. Id. at 1350; see also Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 953
(7th Cir. 2007).
46. Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1350 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
47. Id. at 1312; Cf Crawford, 472 F.3d at 951-952.
48. Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1350 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
49. Id.
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tive alternatives to the 2006 Act, such as criminal statutes penalizing
voter fraud and the identification requirement of the previous law,
which no one had ever been accused of violating. 50 As a result, the
Court enjoined enforcement of the 2006 law for the 2006 election 51 .
After a long and somewhat torturous procedural history, the
District Court held a three-day bench trial in August 200752, and on
September 6, 2007, the case was dismissed after finding none of the
plaintiffs had standing to bring the action. 53 Nonetheless, the District
Court went on to discuss the merits of the case and concluded it would
have upheld the statute because the "plaintiffs simply have failed to
prove that the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the
right to vote is significant."54 In particular, the District Court noted
each of the named plaintiffs testified they would have obtained the nec-
essary identification without much inconvenience if the statute were
upheld. 55
The District Court also took solace in the voter education efforts
the State had undertaken to inform citizens about the law and ulti-
mately concluded that the plaintiffs simply have not presented
sufficient admissible evidence to show that the Photo ID requirement
severely burdens the right to vote. 56 As a result, the Court refused to
apply the higher threshold of strict scrutiny and concluded that the
statute was rationally related to the state's interest in preventing voter
fraud. 57
D. The Michigan Voter Identification Law
The Michigan Supreme Court tackled the issue of Michigan's
voter photo identification law after the Michigan House of Representa-
tives requested its opinion pursuant to the Michigan Constitution.58
50. Id. at 1351.
51. Id. at 1360.
52. Id. at 1342.
53. Id. at 1374. This finding is in direct conflict with the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Crawford, which specifically held that the Democratic Party had standing to challenge the
Indiana law. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 951 (7th Cir. 2007).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1377-78.
56. Id., quoting Rotika, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775 ("Despite apocalyptic assertions of
wholesale voter disenfranchisement, Plaintiffs have produced not a single piece of evidence
of any identifiable registered voter who would be prevented from voting pursuant to [the
2006 Photo ID Act])."
57. Id. at 1312.
58. In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 2005, 740
N.W.2d 444, 449 (Mich. 2007).
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The Michigan legislature passed a law in 1996 requiring all would-be
voters to show photo identification as a precondition to voting in a pol-
ling place on Election Day. However, this law has never been enforced
on Election Day because the Attorney General in 1997 issued an opin-
ion that the law violated the Fourteenth Amendment.59 The Michigan
legislature subsequently re-enacted the 1996 voter identification provi-
sions in 2005 and sought the Michigan Supreme Court's opinion. 60
The Michigan Supreme Court ruled that the voter identification
requirement was constitutional because it did not impose a severe bur-
den on voters' rights. 61 The Michigan court, in particular, stressed
"the statute explicitly provides that an elector without photo identifica-
tion need only sign an affidavit in the presence of an election inspector
before being 'allowed to vote.' 62 The Michigan Supreme Court then
concluded that "the affidavit alternative to the photo identification re-
quirement imposes less of a burden than is imposed on those voters
who are required to execute a sworn statement before casting a provi-
sional ballot."6 3 As a result, "[tihere is simply no basis to conclude that
requiring an elector to sign an affidavit as an alternative to presenting
photo identification imposes a severe burden on the right to vote."64
As in the other cases, the Michigan Supreme Court was not
presented with any evidence that in-person voting fraud had ever oc-
curred in Michigan. That absence did not long occupy the Michigan
court, which instead concluded "there is no requirement that the Legis-
lature 'prove' that significant in-person voter fraud exists before it may
permissibly act to prevent it." 65 In other words, the legislature need
not be constrained to solving existing problems, but as long as they are
all present in the Capitol anyway, why not also take a stab at non-
existent problems as well?
E. Missouri's Voter Identification Law
In 2006, the Missouri legislature enacted a statute requiring
voters to present federal or state issued identification in order to cast
ballots on Election Day.66 A group of voters sued, claiming that the
59. Id. at 1.
60. Id. at 5.
61. Id. at 6.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 204 (Mo. 2006); MO. ANN. STAT. § 11.427
(2006).
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law adversely impacted "low-income, disabled or elderly" citizens by
violating their right to vote and denying them equal protection under
the Missouri Constitution. 67 The Supreme Court of Missouri prefaced
its consideration by noting that the rights to vote and equal protection
protected by the Missouri constitution were "even more extensive than
those provided by the federal constitution." 68 In striking down the
statute, the Missouri Court conducted the same analysis as the federal
courts in Crawford, Gonzalez, and Billups.69
Unlike Crawford, the Missouri plaintiffs lacked the requisite
identification necessary to vote but were all otherwise eligible to vote. 70
As a result, in order to be eligible to vote in the 2008 election, each of
the plaintiffs would be required to obtain the necessary identifica-
tion.71 Because the process of obtaining the identification required
both the expenditure of money and time, the voter identification sys-
tem imposed a "substantial burden" on the right to vote and the
Missouri Supreme Court subjected the statute to strict scrutiny.7 2
The Missouri court next concluded the state had a significant,
compelling and important interest in combating voter fraud.7 3 With
that established, however, the Missouri Supreme Court went on to con-
clude that the statute was not necessary to achieve this compelling
interest and the statute was not "narrowly drawn to address the com-
pelling interest at stake."74 The Missouri Supreme Court stated the
statute was not necessary because "[n]o evidence was presented that
voter impersonation fraud exists to any substantial degree in Missouri.
In fact, the evidence that was presented indicated that voter imperson-
ation fraud is not a problem in Missouri."75 The only "specific instance
of possible vote fraud" involved an attempt by a person who had al-
ready voted absentee to vote in-person, an instance that the photo
identification requirement would not have addressed.7 6
Because the photo identification requirement "could only pre-
vent the particular type of voter fraud that the record does not show
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See generally Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 949 (7th Cir.
2007), Gonzalez v. Arizona, 485 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2007) and, Common Cause/Ga. v.
Billups, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (N.D. Ga. 2007).
70. Weinschenk, 2003 S.W.3d. at 213.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 215.
73. Id. at 217.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 205.
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existing in Missouri", the statute was not narrowly tailored to achieve
the State's compelling interest, and therefore violated the equal protec-
tion clause of the State constitution. 77
III. MEASURING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
ELECTION RELATED LAWS
The fact there is no evidence that voter impersonation ever oc-
curs does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the photo
identification requirements are unconstitutional. Theses laws raise a
conflict between two competing interests: (1) deterring unlawful imper-
sonation of a voter, and (2) access for all eligible voters. As Justice
Stevens, in concurring that Gonzalez should be remanded, stated: "two
important factual issues remain largely unresolved: the scope of the
disenfranchisement that the novel identification requirements will
produce, and the prevalence and character of the fraudulent practices
that allegedly justify those requirements."78
There can be little dispute that the photo identification require-
ment imposes a burden upon the right to vote. This is so because the
law requires the potential voter to do something they previously were
not required to do; open their wallet and present identification.7 9 Ordi-
narily a statute will survive a challenge if it is rationally related to the
accomplishment of a legitimate state interest.80 However, if the chal-
lenged statute implicates a fundamental right, it must satisfy strict
scrutiny by being narrowly tailored to achieve a state's compelling in-
terest.8 1 The Supreme Court recognized voting as a fundamental right
in Reynolds v. Sims,8 2 which should lead to the application of strict
scrutiny.
In evaluating election related laws the Supreme Court has con-
cluded neither simple rational basis review nor strict scrutiny are
appropriate since "as a practical matter, there must be a substantial
77. Id. at 219.
78. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
79. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983) (any provision which regulates
the selection and eligibility of candidates "inevitably affects-at least to some degree-the
individual's right to vote and his right to associate with others for political ends").
80. Ry. Express v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
81. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
82. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964) ("the right of suffrage is a fundamental
matter in a free and democratic society").
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regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort
of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic process. ' s3
The Supreme Court's logic is rational basis review is not appro-
priate because it would in all likelihood result in an undue burden on a
person's right to vote and the state's law would be upheld. Likewise,
strict scrutiny is too stringent a standard and would result in virtually
all voting regulations being invalid due to the existence of a less re-
strictive alternative. For example, virtually every state requires
prospective candidates to file a nominating petition signed by a num-
ber of eligible voters in order to qualify for the ballot.8 4 The purpose of
this requirement is to limit the ballot to those candidates who have
demonstrated a sufficient modicum of support amongst the electo-
rate.8 5 If such laws were subject to strict scrutiny then all such laws
would be invalid. No matter how low the state sets the signature
threshold, a less restrictive alternative would always be available until
any signature requirement greater than the one already set would be
impermissible. Indeed, the Supreme Court has specifically concluded
that:
To subject every voting regulation to strict scrutiny and to require
that the regulation be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling
state interest ... would tie the hands of States seeking to assure
that elections are operated equitably and efficiently. Accordingly,
the mere fact that a State's system creates barrier ... tending to
limit the field of candidates from which voters might choose ...
does not itself compel strict scrutiny.8 6
Recognizing this difficulty, the Supreme Court has articulated a
balancing test for cases involving regulations of elections and voting.8 7
In reviewing such laws, the Court has directed reviewing courts to un-
dertake the following analysis:
[A court] must first consider the character and magnitude of the
asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It then must
identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State
as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. In passing
83. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S.
724, 730 (1974)).
84. See 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-10 (2006).
85. Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986) ("an important state
interest in requiring some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support before
printing the name of a political organizations' candidate on the ballot").
86. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433.
87. In his dissenting opinion in Crawford, Judge Evans describes this balance as "strict
scrutiny light." Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 954 (7th Cir. 2007)
(Evans, J., dissenting).
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judgment, the Court must not only determine the legitimacy and
strength of each of those interests; it also must consider the extent
to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiffs
rights.88
The "rigorousness" of this inquiry depends on the "extent to
which a challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights."8 9 "Severe" restrictions must be narrowly drawn to
advance a state's interest of "compelling importance."90 On the other
hand, "when a state election law provision imposes only reasonable,
nondiscriminatory restrictions upon the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights of voters, 'the State's important regulatory interests are
generally sufficient to justify' the restrictions."91
The irony of these voter identification cases is that the statutes
are designed to prevent a crime that no one seems to be committing,
based upon the lack of evidence of such crimes in the records before the
courts. On the other hand, the laws do not appear to discourage many,
or in the case of Indiana, any people from voting. As a result, this real-
ization begs the question - what gives? If this law discourages few
voters and prevents no crimes, why on earth was it pending before the
Supreme Court?
IV. THE POLITICS OF VOTER IDENTIFICATION LAWS
"Lets not beat around the bush", begins Judge Evans' biting dis-
sent in Crawford. "The Indiana voter identification law is a not-too-
thinly-veiled attempt to discourage election-day turnout by certain
folks believed to skew Democratic." 92 Even Judge Posner recognized
that "most people who don't have photo identification are low on the
economic ladder and thus, if they do vote, are more likely to vote for
Democratic than Republican candidates." 93 Indeed, the District Court
specifically recognized that "this litigation is the result of a partisan
legislative disagreement that has spilled out of the state house into the
courts."94 The fact that the Indiana Democratic Party was the lead
plaintiff says enough about which side won that legislative battle.
88. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).
89. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Crawford, 472 F.3d at 954 (Evans, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 951.
94. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775 (S.D. Ind. 2005).
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Likewise, although Arizona voters approved Proposition 200 by
popular referendum, they did so on the same day they selected George
Bush for President by a vote of 54.9% versus John Kerry's 44.5%.95
Thus it is fair to say, at least in November 2004, Arizona was a Repub-
lican state.
Similarly in Georgia, passage of both the 2005 and 2006 voter
identification laws was overwhelmingly partisan. In the Georgia
House of Representatives, eighty-nine Republicans and two Democrats
voted in favor of the law.96 In the Georgia Senate, "thirty one Republi-
cans . . . voted to approve . . . the Act, while eighteen Democrats and
two Republicans voted against it." 9 7 The passage of the 2006 Act was
equally partisan, with the House Committee on Government Affairs
approving the bill on a straight party-line vote on the very first day of
session.98 In the end, the bill passed the Georgia Senate by a landslide
vote of 32 in favor (all Republicans) and 22 against (21 Democrats and
1 Republican). 99
Finally, passage of the Missouri law was no less partisan. "The
Missouri General Assembly passed the law ... in the last week of this
year's legislative session after a contentious Senate debate in which
Democrats mounted a filibuster to block the bill. The Republican-con-
trolled Senate approved a rarely used motion to cut off debate and
forced its passage." 100
In a related but more ironic development, one federal court has
even ordered the implementation of a voter identification requirement
for primary elections, but at the behest of the Democrats. 01 In Missis-
sippi Democratic Party v. Barbour, the State Democratic Party sued to
close its primary by imposing a party registration requirement. 0 2 The
Party sought to exercise its associational rights by limiting participa-
tion in its primary elections to pre-registered Democrats, and
accordingly disassociating with anyone not so registered. 0 3 The Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, however, not only
allowed the pre-registration but also implemented a voter identifica-
tion requirement in order to allow the Party to verify the identity of its
95. http://www.command-post.org/2004/2_archives/cat-arizona.html.
96. Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1305 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1304.
100. http://www.votetrustusa.org/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=1637
&Itemid=113.
101. Mississippi Democratic Party v. Barbour, 491 F. Supp. 2d 641 (N.D. Miss. 2007).
102. Id. at 645.
103. Id.
Vol. 3: 1:1
WHERE ARE YOUR PAPERS?
members. 10 4 Needless to say, this is not quite the relief that the Demo-
crats wanted as their motion for reconsideration was denied. '0 5
Of course, the fact that the passage of these voter identification
laws is intensely partisan does not render them unconstitutional. In-
deed, bills pass or fail along party lines all the time. But when the bill
is in the area of elections it does, however, justify a more skeptical
analysis of the proffered reasons for the law. When an election law
passes on an overwhelmingly party-line basis there is almost certainly
some partisan advantage and perhaps it is worth considering whether
any other stated reason is pretextual.
V. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF VOTER IDENTIFICATION LAWS
Under the Supreme Court's balancing test articulated in Bur-
dick, the threshold determination must be the nature of the burden
imposed by the voter identification laws. If the burden is severe, then
the statute must be supported by a compelling state interest. If how-
ever, the burden is "reasonable" and "non-discriminatory," then the
statute need only support the state's "important regulatory"
interests 106
Are voter identification requirements a severe restriction on
voting rights? It hardly seems likely, as not a single person in Indiana
indicated that they were discouraged from voting by the requirement.
Similarly in Georgia, the plaintiffs indicated that they would obtain
the necessary documents if the statute were upheld. At best, a handful
of voters in all of the states combined came forward to indicate that
they would be adversely impacted by the identification requirement.
Moreover, the evidence supported the conclusion that each of these
people would be able to obtain the identification without much inconve-
nience. As a result, the Courts' conclusion that these laws were not
severe burdens is supportable.
104. Id. at 662. ("The reason that requiring voter identification in this instance is a
proper exercise of federal power and not mere 'judicial legislation'-other than the logical
conclusion drawn from the Complaint's own language asking the court to enjoin the State
from not providing a means for the Party to verify who participated in its primary . . . -is
that the constitutional right asserted in this case, the right to disassociate, presumes the
ability to accurately identify voters as those with whom the plaintiffs want to associate and
disassociate. This requires party registration and voter identification. As it noted in its June
8, 2007 opinion, however, the court did not rule that voter identification was required in
general elections because general elections are not at issue in this case and such a
requirement is not tied to an asserted constitutional right to disassociate").
105. Id.
106. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433, 433 (1992).
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This does not, however, end the inquiry. Because these voter
identification laws do not impose severe burdens, they need not be jus-
tified by a compelling state interest. Nevertheless, there must be
"reasonable and non-discriminatory" methods of supporting the impor-
tant regulatory state interest.10 7 The voter identification laws are
certainly non-discriminatory in that they apply equally to all potential
voters. No groups of citizens are exempt from the identification re-
quirement. The plaintiffs in these cases argued that these
requirements unduly burdened particular groups, such as the poor, the
elderly, and the infirm.'08 However, all election related laws affect
people in different circumstances in different ways. A healthy person
can more easily walk to the polling place than a sick or injured person.
A driver can get to the polling place easier than those that must take
public transportation. Does that render the polling place system un-
constitutional? Because each citizen must go through exactly the same
steps to obtain the necessary identification, and can do so under the
same conditions as everyone else, the voter identification laws are non-
discriminatory.
That leaves the question of whether these laws are reasonable
to support an important regulatory state interest. At first glance, this
appears to be an easy question to answer: who could argue that pre-
vention of voter fraud is not an important state interest? Indeed,
courts have consistently recognized fraud prevention as a legitimate
state interest.10 9 But does the voter identification requirement help
achieve the goal of fraud prevention?
The single most consistent fact in these cases is the lack of evi-
dence that in-person, Election Day voter impersonation ever occurs.
None of the cases reported even a single instance of someone being
charged or convicted with that offense. Judge Posner, in his Crawford
decision, attributes that to the "endemic under enforcement of minor
criminal laws." 10
First of all, anyone with my history of parking citations would
certainly take issue with Judge Posner's description of law enforce-
ment's enthusiasm for enforcing minor crimes. Moreover, Judge
Posner does not say why it would be more difficult to apprehend a voter
impersonator than a shoplifter. More importantly, if true, this expla-
nation would only explain why no one was ever charged or convicted of
107. Id.
108. Cf. In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 2005, 740
N.W.2d 444, 458 (Mich. 2007).
109. Cf. Nadar v. Keith, 385 F.3d 729, 734 (7th Cir. 2004).
110. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 953 (7th Cir. 2007).
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voter fraud. These cases also lacked any evidence anyone had ever wit-
nessed, complained of, or even suspected any in-person voter
impersonation.
Instead, Judge Posner himself supplies the reason why voter
impersonation does not occur in polling places, which is it doesn't ac-
complish anything. According to Judge Posner, the benefit to the
individual in voting is minimal, or "elusive" to use his word, because an
individual vote "rarely has any instrumental value."'11 One vote does
not have much impact because an individual voter never has the oppor-
tunity to cast the deciding vote.'1 2 If Judge Posner's supposition is
true, why would anyone run the risk of apprehension and prosecution
as a vote impersonator if there is no chance that the stolen vote would
have any impact on the results? Indeed, the only way for voter fraud to
be effective would be for an individual to either become a serial voter
impersonator or appear numerous times at multiple polling places
throughout Election Day or to join together with like minded individu-
als in a concocted scheme to snatch the election through strategic
impersonations. Either alternative would no doubt greatly increase
the risk of detection and apprehension. Surely, even a single instance
of serial or schematic voter impersonation would have come to the at-
tention of election authorities in one of these states, regardless of
whether the culprits were ever charged with or convicted of anything.
The unreasonableness of these laws is clarified considering the
mix of the intensely partisan nature in which these laws come into be-
ing. In each state legislature, the passage of these bills was
overwhelmingly supported by one party, and equally opposed by the
other. For example, Arizona voters approved the voter identification
law the same day they gave George Bush a landslide victory." 3 This
alone says nothing about these laws' constitutionality, but it does sup-
port the conclusion that the stated reason, voter fraud prevention, was
perhaps at least partly pretextual and that partisan advantage was at
least an equally important motivation. Did the Democrats who op-
posed these bills really support commission of voter fraud?
Legislatures certainly should have the right to address
problems with foresight, rather than hindsight. 1 4 The Michigan Su-
preme Court's prediction that "a State's political system sustains some
level of damage before the legislature could take corrective action" and
that any such action "would invariably lead to endless court battles
111. Id. at 951.
112. Id.
113. See (http://www.command-post.org/2004/2_archives/catarizona.html).
114. See Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1986).
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over the sufficiency of the 'evidence' marshaled by a State... "is cer-
tainly overblown. 115
There can be no dispute that these laws on their face impose
limits on eligibility to vote on Election Day, because at a minimum, as
Judge Posner recognized, "a few people who have photo identification
but forget to bring it to the polling place will say what the hell and not
vote . . . ."116 When a state acts to restrict voter participation and does
so ostensibly to address a problem, it is not too much to require that
the alleged problem at least to some degree exists. In his dissent in the
Michigan opinion, Judge Cavanagh put it succinctly: "[i]t is not reason-
able to impose a photo identification requirement when the alleged
interest is nonexistent in-person voter fraud, especially when the re-
quirement will significantly impinge upon the rights of thousands of
Michigan's citizens.' 1 7
In upholding these photo identification laws, courts appear to
treat the Burdick balancing test as an either/or proposition. If a chal-
lenged statute imposes severe restrictions on voting, it must survive
strict scrutiny." 8 If, on the other hand, a court determines that the
burden is not severe, they appear to simply apply rational basis re-
view.' 1 9 Rather than treat Burdick as an either/or analysis, however,
courts should view Burdick as an intermediate level of scrutiny that
always demands more justification than a statute subject to rational
basis review. This conclusion is supported by the Supreme Court's
description of the state interests for various levels of scrutiny: laws
subject to strict scrutiny must meet a state's "compelling" interest;
those subject to rational basis review must satisfy a state's "legitimate"
interest; but election laws imposing non-severe burdens on the right to
vote must satisfy the state's "important regulatory" interests. 20 In
Burdick the Supreme Court used a term other than "legitimate" when
describing the necessary state interest that indicates it intended to ap-
ply a different, and heightened, level of scrutiny to even those laws
that impose non-severe burdens on the right to vote.
This intermediate level of scrutiny is further justified because
any election related statute, regardless of whether or not it imposes a
115. In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 2005, 740
N.W.2d 444, 458 (Mich. 2007).
116. Crawford, 472 F.3d at 951.
117. In re request for Advisory Opinion, 740 N.W.2d at 486 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting).
118. See Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1345 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
119. See Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1380 (N.D. Ga. 2007); In
re Request for Advisory Opinion, 740 N.W.2d at 472-483.
120. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).
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severe burden, could have the effect of restricting the fundamental
right to vote. In other words, a state should never restrict the right to
vote and escape with simple rational basis review. If the state acts to
restrict that right, even in a manner that is not severe, it should be
subject to heightened but not strict scrutiny.
That is not to say that the legislature must justify its actions
before it acts. Instead, once a plaintiff establishes that an election re-
lated law has the facial effect of constricting voter participation, the
state should be able to demonstrate that the law is a reasonable
method to achieving an important state goal. 121 Under this scenario,
as a threshold matter a plaintiff would be required to demonstrate the
challenged law has the effect of diminishing electoral participation. If
the plaintiff makes such a showing, the burden would shift to the state
to demonstrate that the law is reasonably tailored to attain its impor-
tant goals of regulating elections.
In these reviewed cases, the plaintiffs have satisfied their bur-
den because the voter identification laws will, as Judge Posner
recognized, necessarily result in reduced participation. Based upon
the evidence from these five cases however, the states have not demon-
strated that in-person, Election Day voter impersonation is a real, or
even potential problem. Because there is no evidence that in-person
voter impersonation is a problem, the laws are not reasonably designed
to achieve an important regulatory interest. In short, solving a non-
existent problem cannot be fairly described as an important state in-
terest sufficient to support a law restricting voter participation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Voter identification laws are a solution in search of a problem.
The lack of any allegations of voter impersonation compels the conclu-
sion that these laws are not reasonably designed to achieve the states'
interest in preventing vote fraud. Instead, what these laws will accom-
plish, according to the evidence in the reviewed cases, is to discourage
at least some citizens from voting.122 Election laws should encourage
all eligible citizens to participate, and laws that restrict participation
should be reasonably designed to help the state administer its elec-
tions. When it comes to laws constricting participation in our electoral
system, the state cannot reasonably solve a problem that doesn't exist.
121. See In re Advisory Opinion, 740 N.W.2d at 485 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting).
122. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 955 (7th Cir. 2007)
(Evans, J., dissenting).
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